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INTRODUCTION 
Deepfakes have been used by practitioners since 2017 as a cheap and rapid means of face 
replacement in digital video. Deployed with both playful and malign purposes, as well as by 
artist-activists as political provocations, the practice has paraded a spectacle of technological 
subculture, a nose-snubbing to the high-end Digital Visual Effects (DVFX) face replacements 
perfected by Disney Studios for major Hollywood blockbusters. This oppositional subculture 
initially reveled in its low-grade achievements, with early deepfakes (DFs) produced at very low 
resolution, typically no more than 294x500 pixels. While recent research has strived to upgrade 
resolution (Naruniec et al 2020), the world of deepfakes continues to exist almost exclusively 
within the confines of a handheld screen culture in which such low-quality images are 
acceptable. This paper examines the potential development of the deepfakes application of 
machine learning into mainstream screen production. One of the first such examples of this was 
seen in December 2020, when the UK broadcaster, Channel Four, aired an Alternative 
Christmas Message that used deepfake processes to create a synthetized Queen Elizabeth II to 
address her nationi. The program’s director, William Bartlett, emphasized that the purpose was 
to illustrate the unreliability of the moving image in the era of deepfakes, although audience 
reactions pointing to the unbelievability of the depiction of the monarchii undermined the sense 
of threat. Bartlett was working with the full resources of one of the biggest DVFX postproduction 
houses, Framestore, so this deepfake was still embedded in the elite world of high-budget 
filmmaking. In this article, we predict a near-future in which open source machine learning has 
democratized access to face replacement in High Definition digital video; we discuss questions 
around the technological routes to this goal of high quality DFs in fiction production, as well as 
the major ethical and legal issues that creative practitioners will face when choosing this tool. 
Our work focusses on the creation of synthetized screen characters based on deceased 
celebrities, developing from an ongoing interdisciplinary practice research project, Virtual 
Maggie, that explores whether Margaret Thatcher could be digitally resurrected, using machine 




learning, to play herself in a new period dramaiii. The current article is both a report on the 
research findings of Virtual Maggie, as well as a widening consideration of the issues 
concerned, and is structured around the three themes of that investigation: 
• Creative screen practice: how are the processes, relationships and responsibilities of the 
filmmaker changed when applying deepfakes to the construction of screen characters? 
• Technological practice: what are the methodological choices available in using machine 
learning for character face replacement using historical figures and what level of visual 
quality can be achieved? 
• Legal context: to what extent is UK and international law prepared for the exploitation of 
individuals’ images after their death and what legal considerations should be taken by 
practitioners when creating deepfakes of major historical figures? 
Consistent with the interdisciplinary nature of the Virtual Maggie project, this article is designed 
to have relevance within three traditions of academic study: film studies/practice, computer 
science, and law. The three sections of the article are expressed in the language of these 
disciplines, before we bring together the findings of the research to discuss shared conclusions. 
CREATIVE SCREEN PRACTICE 
Theories of screen performance 
The digital replacement of an actor’s face further complicates our understanding of the nature of 
screen performance, adding a layer of technological intervention to a process that has long 
been understood as a composite of creative inputs. James Naremore (1986) discussed the 
‘expressive coherence’ of multiple elements of a single complete film performance. These could 
be different layers of performance achieved by actors while creating their screen characters, but 
the term also describes the fragmented and recombined elements of performance due to the 
processes of filmmaking. Naremore also stressed that a screen performance may involve the 
labor of several individuals, pointing out that ‘movies are the only medium in which several 
actors are typically used to play one role’ (1986, 50), referring to the work of stunt performers, 
voice actors and body doubles that supplement the actor’s performance. In addition to this, the 
labor of a film’s editor, sound editor and colorist have always added subtle contributions to the 
creation of a film character presented to the audience. This does not negate the primary role of 
the actor, rather it emphasizes the breadth of the creative effort required to generate screen 
performance. The recent addition of digital face replacement adds significant new human and 
technological inputs to the collective process of building a film character. For Lisa Bode, this 




represents a conceptual challenge: ‘we need to examine what is actually achieved when 
performance, technology, special and visual effects, and animation work together both on and 
behind the screen’ (2017, 11). As a historian of cinema, Bode’s work (2007, 2010) establishes a 
context for current debates about digital resurrection in the context of deepfakes, providing an 
early definition of what is now becoming known as ‘performance synthetization’ - the digital 
manipulation of a performance or a performer’s likeness (Pavis 2020).  
Virtual Maggie 
A significant quality of the Virtual Maggie practice research project is its reflection of real-world 
film industry creative processes.  The origins of this project stem from a feature screenplay, 
Rebel Bus, an as-yet unproduced drama set in South Wales and Northern Ireland in 1989.  The 
narrative includes a small role for Margaret Thatcher, in which the prime minister responds to 
the disruption of her handling of the ‘The Troubles’ caused by an unlikely group of Welsh 
football fans who follow their team to a sporting fixture in a war zone – the IRA-controlled 
Bogside of Derry. In the film industry, the ‘development’ stage of preproduction includes the 
drafting of the screenplay, followed by important early work on casting, which will have a major 
influence over the successful financing of the picture. In the case of Rebel Bus, the part of 
Margaret Thatcher was too small to be attractive to actors who had successfully played her on 
screen in earlier movies, such as Meryl Streep (The Iron Lady, Phyllida Lloyd, 2011). The 
filmmakers then considered the option of digital resurrection: instead of asking the audience to 
believe the interpretation of Thatcher by an actress, technology could allow them to build a 
hybrid screen character, Virtual Maggie, using the body of an actor combined with a digitally re-
rendered face of Margaret Thatcher herself. Hollywood’s high-budget DVFX approach to 
performance synthetization was clearly not an option for an independent film production in its 
early concept stages; the only available route to the goal of creating Virtual Maggie was to adopt 
a machine learning, or Deepfake approach. 
Such decision-making remains innovative in the screen industries, in which there is still little 
adoption by mainstream producers of digital face replacement as a creative tool. The choice to 
pursue a machine learning route to creating Virtual Maggie was optimistic, requiring an 
extended process of technological research. However, this practice research project foresees 
that within a few years of improvement of machine learning, such a scenario of decision-making 
may take place with frequency in film and television production companies of all sizes. Machine 
learning represents a credible future for creative decision-makers across the screen industries, 
giving the Virtual Maggie research project timeliness and urgency.  




Limitations of technology 
The discussion of technological breakthroughs is frequently framed by an ideology of potential, 
a belief that the development of new techniques will open up limitless opportunities for creativity 
or productivity. The reality is that each new process generates its own limitations, requiring its 
adopters to conform to the characteristics dictated to them by the structure and design of the 
new technology. The Virtual Maggie project enabled its researchers to study the limitations of 
machine learning-based face replacement at its current stage of development. Two key issues 
will be developed, illuminating how machine learning creates considerable challenges for the 
creative process of filmmaking. 
A common characteristic of the most well-known deepfakes is how the camera is used. A 
recurring pattern emerges: the camera is locked-off, usually framing its subject in a mid-shot or 
loose MCU. Furthermore, a typical performance style is repeated: the actor/subject is seated or 
standing still.   
 
Figure 1: Locked-down screen performance: screengrabs from Jordan Peele’s DF of Barack Obama; DF 
of Kim Kardashian by Bill Posters 
The strategy being used here is framed to accommodate a weakness of the use of machine 
learning processes in performance synthetization. Any movement of the face in relation to the 
camera, either by the performer or through camera movement, creates major additional 
requirements in the processing of the composite digital image. Many of the high-profile 
deepfakes, such as those in Figure 1, have been based on the manipulation of just the mouth 
and lips of the subject; without the need to engineer fake head movements, the AI task 
becomes relatively straightforward. In comparison, the task of digital face replacement in a 
normal film drama, with changing shot sizes, expressive acting, and camera movements, 
becomes a much more significant challenge. Scale of face is also important. Deepfakes have, 




from their origin, been produced at low resolution, typically no more than 294x500 pixels. 
Despite the recent research seeking to upscale this resolution (Naruniec et al 2020), in any 
digital face replacement the size of the face within the image will have a major bearing on the 
efficacy of the AI process. In Figure 1, we can see that the framing adopted by Bill Posters when 
working on his deepfake of Kim Kardashian was a shrewder choice than that of the Jordan 
Peele deepfake of Barack Obama: whereas Kardashian’s face occupies less than a quarter of 
the vertical space of the frame, Obama’s covers more than half.   
During the practice research of the first stage of the Virtual Maggie project, the filming of scenes 
in studio and on location, the impact of this limitation of the deepfake technology became 
apparent. The director and cinematographer were constrained while constructing shots of 
Margaret Thatcher. Advised on set by the project’s computer scientist, continuous attention to 
the scale of the actress’s face in the frame was necessary. Certain shot sizes, such as Close-up 
and Medium Close-up, were abandoned because of the challenges that this would create to the 
face replacement process.   
 
Figure 2: On set during the Virtual Maggie shoot: Medium Shot of actress Ros Adler  
A second significant limitation of the machine learning process also impacted on decision-
making. Attentive followers of deepfakes will have noticed that the eyeline of synthetized 
characters is always very close to the lens. In most non-fiction deepfakes, the subject 
addresses the camera directly (cf Fig.1); in the small number of fictitious scenes that include 
deepfakes, the character undergoing digital face replacement is almost always facing towards 
the camera. This is because the machine learning process finds it particularly difficult to 
successfully replace a face seen in a side angle, a limitation that has profound implications for 




the conventions of cinema. We will take an example from one scene in the Virtual Maggie 
sequence, in which the Prime Minister and her Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Tom 
King, are travelling in a car. The culture of cinema has developed a portfolio of customary shot 
choices for travelling car scenes, and many of these are derived from the practical problems of 
positioning a film camera in, or on, a moving vehicle. Frontal angles shot using a camera mount 
on the car bonnet or a low-loader camera vehicle are supplemented by over-the-shoulder (OTS) 
profile shots of the actors, filmed either from within the car or using camera mounts on the 
doors. The Virtual Maggie scene begins with a standard loose frontal two-shot of Margaret 
Thatcher and Tom King sitting side-by-side. The crew then set up and filmed two 
complementary OTS side angles of the characters (Fig 3), following a typical choice of shots 
coherent with cinematic tradition. 
 
Figure 3: Interior car scene - preparing side angle shot for Virtual Maggie 
Following a consultation with the project’s Co-Investigator responsible for carrying out the 
deepfakes processing in the project, it was decided that such side angles could be extremely 
difficult to integrate into the deepfake workflow: two supplementary shots were added to the 
schedule, Medium Shots of each character filmed from within the car that specifically avoided 
the side angle position, with both Margaret Thatcher and Tom King’s eyelines close to camera. 
This was essential in order to give flexibility in postproduction: if our machine learning process 
were to be incapable of digitally replacing actress Ros Adler’s face in the OTS profile of Maggie, 
we could resort to re-editing the scene using just the supplementary shots.  
The practice research of the Virtual Maggie project has illuminated key alterations to the 
portfolio of creative choices available to a filmmaker when using deepfake technology, 
specifically the shots sizes and camera angles that are possible. Other early practitioners, such 




as William Bartlett in his Alternative Christmas Message (2020), demonstrate an awareness of 
these problems in their language of camera framing.  Bartlett’s Elizabeth II is framed frontally 
throughout, including in her desktop dance sequence (Fig 4). 
 
Figure 4: Alternative Christmas Message (William Bartlett, 2020) 
If deepfakes become a mainstream creative choice of film and television producers in the next 
few years, a potential impact on screen culture may arise. The limitations of the technology will 
influence creative choice, significantly limiting how the digital film camera captures action. 
Camera movement may also become restricted in dramas using deepfakes: Bartlett’s opening 
shot, a crabbing movement infront of the Queen’s desk, is one of the weakest in terms of the 
believability of his deepfake project, illuminating further deficiencies of the technology that future 
filmmakers may seek to avoid by adopting static camera positions during deepfake sequences.  
The issue of how technological requirements of the deepfake process cause creative 
constraints in cinematography fits into a pattern across the history of cinema, in which 
breakthroughs in technology impact other aspects of the creative process, most frequently the 
work of actors. In the early ‘talkies’ era, the practice of hiding the microphone behind a prop 
limited the blocking of actors, who could not deliver lines at any distance from this part of the 
set. The telescopic boom was quickly developed to overcome this problem. More recently, the 
common use of greenscreen cinematography forces the actor to perform in isolation instead of 
in an ensemble, an experience that nearly led to Sir Ian McKellen abandoning his career when 
he played in The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey (Peter Jackson, 2012)iv. Current deepfakes 
technology should be seen as the beginning of a process in which the screen industries first 
adopt new processes, then confront their limitations, before adapting production practices in 
order to address the new constraints posed by advances in screen technologies. 




A further insight from the film shoot stage of the Virtual Maggie project has been the importance 
of the director-technologist creative relationship. Central to the successful construction of 
digitally synthetized characters is the level of creative and technical understanding between 
these two key individuals. Throughout the film’s preproduction and during the shoot, an ongoing 
dialogue about the potentials and the limitations of machine learning contributes to each of the 
decisions made. This collaboration then flows into the second stage of producing a deepfake 
screen character - the machine learning process that begins when the editing of scenes is 
complete. 
TECHNOLOGICAL PRACTICE 
Challenges of creating deepfakes of historical figures  
 
The deep fake methods used to synthetize the appearance of one person to another are largely 
based on the ability of deep neural networks to learn a representation of multiple facial poses of 
one face, and transfer that pose to a second face. Underpinning this is a reliance on a large 
volume of exemplar material which is required in order to successfully train the neural networks 
to accurately carry out the task. While there is a large amount of video content for contemporary 
actors and personalities in the public domain, this is not the case  for the domain of creating 
deep fakes of historical figures. Note, we are limiting this to figures of whom accurate imagery 
exists, for example photography and video; the extension to other sources such as paintings is 
outside the domain considered in this work. The first limitation encountered is the small volume 
of information: while there exists video footage of many historical figures, this is typically less 
than for contemporary figures. Secondly, this footage is likely to be significantly lower quality 
due to technological limitations at the time, degradation of the content and the digitization 
process. Thirdly, much footage is likely to be black and white which again makes it challenging 
for use in modern color productions.  
 
In this section, we create a framework which can solve these technical challenges whilst also 
considering ease of use by end users. One insight is that many of these challenges have been 
tackled by the machine learning, computer vision and computer graphics field, but are yet to be 
fused into a pipeline for historical facial replacement. This framework has been implemented 
into a tool which is designed to produce frames for the Virtual Maggie project. We designed this 
tool considering several factors: the process should lead to plausible face swap results, the 




limitations outlined above should be circumvented, and minimal user interaction should be 
required to generate the final imagery.  
Related Work  
 
There are multiple approaches for swapping faces, from traditional approaches such as warping 
a source face to a target face considering 3D geometry (Blanz, et al., 2004) to models using 
deep learning (Naruniec, et al., 2020). We focus on deep learning approaches for face 
swappingv as these form the current state-of-the-art and more information can be found in the 
survey by Nguyen et al. (Nguyen, et al., 2019). 
 
Early approaches to generating deepfakes were proposed outside academia (DeepFakes, 
2020). These used an encoder network combined with two decoder networks; the shared 
encoder network encodes source and target faces into a shared latent space (Liu, et al., 2017), 
and the two decoder networks reconstruct the source and target images from the latent 
representation. The approach by Naruniec et al. (2020) both generalized the number of outputs, 
and utilized high resolution inputs and outputs to lead to film quality face swapping. However, all 
these approaches reply on a large volume of source and target data to produce viable results. In 
the context of this work, it is expected that there is a large volume of target actor material, but a 
limited amount of source material which leads to these encoder-decoder approaches being 
unsuitable for the historical deep fake context. 
 
Alternative approaches for face replacement which do not rely on large volumes of training data 
are to use Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) (Goodfellow, et al., 2014) to replace faces, 
or to replace features in one image with those in another. Nirkin et al. (2019) proposed a GAN to 
fill-in segmented regions of a target image with a source image. While this can use a relatively 
small amount of data, the results do not generate image quality suitable for film usage. 
Lathuiliere et al. (2020) propose an approach which can directly swap parts between two 
images while retaining natural appearance. This approach learns how to segment faces into 
constituent parts and enables these constituent pieces to be transferred to another frame 
through estimating optical flow (Horn and Schunck, 1981). We base our work on this approach 
as it is suitable for our requirements: it requires one source image, is capable of being used with 
high resolution images, and is relatively robust to changes in facial pose. 
 
 





   
Figure 5: The flow of data in our proposed framework. Initial data sources include a historical image, 
which can be modernized, and a series of frames. Faces are then automatically extracted from both these 
sources. The next stage of the pipeline is the face swap component which swaps the extracted faces 
from each frame of the animation and the modernized historical image. Finally, these are composited 
such that the swapped face has the same lighting and skin appearance as the captured footage.  
 
We propose a three-step framework for face swapping for historical images. The first step 
is Preprocessing where faces are extracted from the historical source image and the target 
frames, and the historical image is modernized if required. The second step is to perform deep 
face synthesis using a deep learning model. This is a ‘black box’ in our framework meaning that 
as future methods are developed, they may be swapped for the existing model if required. The 
final aspect is compositing the swapped face back into the target frames, while preserving the 
original color and illumination information. We propose that this framework should consist of 
several ‘black box’ modules which can be swapped for other modules to keep pace with 
developments in the machine learning and computer graphics fields. The following sections 








Preprocessing of the data serves two purposes. The first is to modernize the source image if 
required, and the second is to extract faces. The historical source image needs to match the 
desired color depth of the target frames. For example, if the target footage is shot in color, then 
the source image also needs to be in color. However, due to camera limitations at the time of 
capture, many source images are black and white. These therefore need to be converted to 
color. Secondly, the resolution of the source imagery needs to be sufficient to match the 
requirements of use in film. If imagery is scanned from physical film, then this is likely to 
produce source images at the desired resolution; however, this cannot be guaranteed for 
existing digital content. Finally, much existing historical imagery and footage has degraded 
quality compared to modern footage. This is due to damage to the source film over time, or low 




Colorization of black and white images can be tracked through deep learning methods. Several 
approaches have been proposed, ranging from a fully connected network combined with filtering 
(Cheng, et al., 2015), to convolutional neural network approaches (Zhang, et al., 2016), GANs 
(Nazeri, et al., 2018) and networks designed for historical footage (Iizuka and Simo-Serra, 2019; 
Antic, 2020). 
 
Upscaling of imagery refers to starting with a low-resolution image and generating a higher 
resolution output. This has been tackled using many different approaches, from traditional 
computer vision and image processing methods such as bicubic upsampling to CNNs (Dong, et 
al., 2014) and GANs (Dong, et al., 2015). For more information about these approaches, see 
the review by Anwar et al. (Anwar, et al., 2020). 
 
Degradation removal was also tackled by Iizuka and Simo-Serra (2019). This work synthesised 
film deterioration effects and applied it to existing footage, then trained a network to remove this 
degradation. Other approaches can detect and remove specific artifacts for historical footage 
(Helm and Kampel, 2020) or noise in images (Yuzhi, et al., 2020). 
 
These steps only need to be applied if the historical image requires modernisation, and steps 
may be omitted: for example, if a source image is in color but low resolution, then only the 
upscaling step is required. 





Face Extraction  
 
In order for the deep face synthesis stage to swap faces, it is either desirable, or sometimes 
essential, that the input to the deep learning system only contains faces. Therefore, once the 
source and target images are obtained, the second step of preprocessing is to extract and crop 
faces from the imagery. The historical source image is required to contain the image of the 
historical figure, and no other information, whereas the target images may contain other actors. 
This stage of preprocessing automatically detects faces in both the source and target images, 
and resizes them to the required resolution for input into the deep learning system. 
 
Face detection can be performed using traditional image processing techniques, such as 
extracting keypoints corresponding to facial features (Viola and Jones, 2001; Wilson and 
Fernandez, 2006) and creating a bounding box around these features, or more modern 
deployed learning face detection techniques can be used. Regardless of the technique used, 
bounding boxes around faces are computed for each image and then resized to the required 
input resolution for the deep face synthesis network. 
 
This however leads to two issues in an automated system. The first is how to deal with the 
situation that the target frames contain multiple actors, and therefore multiple faces. The second 
is how to handle temporal stability of the detected bounding boxes. The first issue can be dealt 
with by first detecting all faces in an image, then comparing face statistics to those of the face of 
the actor whose face should be swapped. The bounding box corresponding to the statistics 
which most closely match those of the target actor is kept, and the remaining are discarded. The 
approach we used in our system was based on Kazemi and Sullivan (2014). The second issue 
was discussed in Naruniec, et al. (2020) and we follow a similar approach by randomly cropping 
a larger region around the initially detected face and re-running the face detection algorithm. 
The average of the resulting bounding boxes, which is itself another bounding box, provides a 
temporally stable estimate of the position of the face in each frame. We also found the 
parameters described in Naruniec, et al. (2020) worked well for our imagery. 
 
Deep Face Synthesis  
 




The second stage of the framework is the deep face synthesis aspect which swaps the faces in 
the source and target crops. As our framework has to work in the situation of limited historical 
data, use of deep learning systems which consist of an encoder and decoder may not be 
feasible as there may be a lack of the data required for training the decoder. Therefore, we 
propose this step should operate using the single source historical image. Fortunately, this is 
achievable using methods based on segmentation and optical flow prediction. We use the 
approach proposed by Lathuiliere et al. (2020) which both segments individual features, for 
example eyes, cheeks, jaw, from both the source and target image, then based on the 
estimation of optical flow, deforms each segmented region in the source image to match the 
corresponding segmented region in the target image. The results of this can be seen in the 




The result of the deep face synthesis stage creates a face with appropriate pose, but preserves 
the skin tone and lighting from the source image, and may contain artifacts on the boundaries of 
segments. The incorrect skin tone, lighting, and remaining artifacts are corrected in the 
compositing stage. Boundary artifacts are removed through replacing the actor’s face in a 
masked region created from keypoints created during the face extraction stage to ensure the 
central area of the face is replaced, rather than the boundaries which are likely to contain 
artifacts.  
 
In order to correct for skin tone and lighting information, we decompose both the swapped face 
and the original actor’s face into a Laplacian pyramid. Each level of the pyramid contains 
progressively lower frequency details, and the lower levels generally encode coarse skin tone 
and lighting information. Similar to Thies, et al. (2015) and Naruniec, et al. (2020), we use the 
skin tone and lighting information from the actor’s face encoded at the lower levels (we use the 
first two levels) then reconstruct from the remaining levels in the Laplacian pyramid of the 
swapped face. This preserves skin tone and lighting across the face, while simultaneously 
preserving the appearance of the swapped face containing the historical figure.  
 
Our Implementation  




   
Figure 6: Screenshot of the user interface. The optional modernisation functionality is enabled by the 
three buttons, and the ‘Run’ button automatically runs the remaining stages of the framework.  
 
We implemented a prototype of the framework as described above. For ease of use, we 
developed a simple user interface to allow the process to occur with a minimal amount of user 
input (see Figure 6). Initially, a source historical image is loaded (Figure 6, top) and the user is 
presented with options to run any of the modernization functionality if required. Then target 
frames are loaded, and the user can select the face of the actor whose face will be replaced in 
the first frame (to build statistics for the face extraction stage). Finally, once an output folder is 
specified, the remaining steps of the framework are run automatically when the "Run!" button is 
pressed. On average this takes around 10 seconds to process each frame on a laptop with a 
Nvidia 1050 GPU, although this average takes into account that each stage of the framework is 
currently run to completion before moving to the next stage of the framework, for example the 
face extraction stage is run for all frames before moving on to the deep face synthesis stage. 
This is significantly more efficient than the alternative of loading and initializing multiple deep 
networks for each frame.  
 
Each stage of the framework is implemented as an interface. This allows components in the 
framework to be removed and replaced with further improved versions of each operation in the 
framework as the state-of-the-art progresses.  
 
   
 




Figure 7: Three consecutive frames showing the original images at the top and the swapped images at 
the bottom.  
 
Finally, Figure 7 shows three frames resulting from running our framework. The top images 
show the original frames as captured during shooting, while the bottom shows the same frames 
using the framework proposed in this work. This prototype of the proposed framework requires 
minimal user interaction and can produce results suitable for deepfake face replacement for 
creative projects such as Virtual Maggie.  
 
LEGAL CONTEXT 
Digital Resurrection vs Deepfakes – a semantic approach or a real division?  
 
A portrayal on screen of a real person is often understood by the audience in the context of the 
film or broadcast they are watching – an actor playing a role in a biographical film (Gary 
Oldman as Churchill in Darkest Hour (Joe Wright, 2017); Marion Cotillard as Edith Piaf in La 
Vie En Rose (Olivier Dahan, 2007)), an actor portraying a real life person in a clearly fictional 
film (Janet Baker reprising her impersonation of Margaret Thatcher in For Your Eyes Only (John 
Glen, 1981); Adrien Cayla-Legrand as Charles de Gaulle in Day Of The Jackal (Fred Zinneman, 
1973)), or real footage of the real life person in a documentary. The audience is normally 
sophisticated enough to distinguish between these as portrayals and the reality – although 
during the filming of Day of The Jackal Adrien Cayla-Legrand was reputedly mistaken by some 
members of the public as the real de Gaulle (then dead for two years).   
 
The proliferation of manipulated images and video and audio has excited legal and legislative 
analysis with a view to potential regulation of  deepfakes. Agendas and discussion around the 
analysis and regulation of such manipulations, without the consent of the original person, have 
varied from fraud (Metliss and Berggren 2020), to performers rights (Pavis 2020), to image 
rights, rights of publicity and persona protection (Farish 2020; Perot and Mostert 2020), to the 
criminal law response to revenge pornography (Crofts and Kirchengast 2019) and privacy rights 
(Chesney and Citron 2019). Legislation in different jurisdictions has seen regulation of 
manipulated material in often very narrow areas: non-consensual sharing of intimate images (or 
so-called revenge porn) in Australia, the creation of manipulated videos designed to influence 
elections in Texas, and manipulated or retouched images in the fashion and advertising industry 




in France and Israel. No attempt as yet has been made to comprehensively regulate such 
manipulations.    
 
The  term Deepfake has no uncontested definition. In the Texas legislation, the definition put 
forward is: ‘s.1: ‘Deep fake video’ is defined as ‘a video, created with the intent to deceive, 
that appears to depict a real person performing an action that did not occur in reality’ (SB751, 
section 1). The legislation is limited in this case to video – not audio or still images – and is not 
specific in the method of creation, whether by human or AI creation. The offence occurs if one 
creates or causes such a deep fake video to be made. Chesney and Citron prefer a definition 
that a Deep Fake is ‘hyper-realistic digital falsification of images, video, and audio’ (2019, 1757). 
In that definition focus is placed on the outcome and method of creation, whilst in the Texas 
Election Code, the key element is intention to deceive.   
 
Is the intention to deceive the audience a key component in the creation of the manipulated 
images/videos? It would seem that many of the examples are done for purpose of parody and 
creating a meme. Taking the example of Charleston (1995), a defamation case, the falsification 
of the images to show the faces of actors from the soap opera Neighbours on the bodies of porn 
actors would clearly deceive no reader. However, the Channel 4 Alternative Christmas Message 
2020 showed a hyper-realistic portrayal of the Queen, although it could be argued that when 
taken with the audio, any critical viewer would have realised that the Queen was not actually 
giving the address, as was the intention.  
 
There are differing schools of thought as to what an intention to deceive could mean. On the 
one hand, it is suggested that intention needs to be manifested by a clear calculation that the 
viewer was to be misled (see e.g. the cases involving Trade Marks such as Re Australian Wine 
Importers and Mason, Re Horsburgh, and Re Maeder’s Application) – that the viewer of the 
manipulated image would not realise that it has been manipulated and that this was the 
intention of the creator. On the other hand, some case law has considered that if deception has 
taken place, then the test is made out, either because it is self-evident that deception has been 
intended as a likely consequence of the similarities or that the viewer has from their own 
perspective been likely to be confused (see in the context of Pharmaceutical goods Potter and 
Clarke Ltd 1947).  
 




Ekaratne (2020) has set out a helpful taxonomy of types of manipulations which could fall within 
the deepfakes definition. In every case the image or video has been manipulated without the 
consent of the subject of the image. The types are: 
 
Category A: Clearly manipulated images with clearly no subject consent to 
disseminate: With this type of image, it is clear (by virtue of text or context or both) not 
only that the image is manipulated but also that the subject did not consent to its 
dissemination.  
Category B: Clearly manipulated images with unclear subject consent to 
disseminate: Such an image is clearly a manipulated image, but it is unclear to the 
reasonable viewer whether or not the subject consented to disseminate it. Unlike with 
Category A images, viewers may believe that the subject consented to dissemination.  
Finally, Category C: Ambiguously manipulated images are those that do not have a 
textual disclaimer of manipulation, and that are also not clearly manipulated owing to 
context. The viewer may believe these are true (non-manipulated) images depicting the 
subject in real life. Belief that the subject consented to disseminate is also possible, but 
the main harms lie in a manipulated image being shown as a true image. (359)  
 
Ekaratne distinguishes between categories on the basis of viewer awareness. If the viewer is 
aware that an image is manipulated, then there is no intention to deceive, neither because the 
creator is intending to mislead nor because the viewer is likely to be misled. It is only in 
Category C that there is an outcome that the viewer is likely to be misled. The film producer 
wishing to use manipulated images such as in Virtual Maggie would need to navigate the 
choppy waters of category 3. The audience is being asked to accept that the scenes on screen 
depicting Margaret Thatcher are believable, just as with the Channel 4 Alternative Christmas 
Message, within the context of the reception of screen fiction. The audience is invited to accept 
that the manipulated image is in fact a true image. The audience is asked to distinguish 
between the portrayal of a real-life character by an actor with a machine-created performance 
created by technology using real images to create a wholly manipulated ‘true image’. 
   
A film producer will argue that unlike many instances of ‘fake news’, the digital manipulation is 
purely for entertainment and artistic purposes, that the viewer does not suffer harm as the 
producer only intends to mislead for entertainment. But in which case, why not use an actor to 
depict the real-life person? The whole intention of the film producer is to serve up a 




photorealistic version that does lead the audience to be likely to be misled. They are looking to 
present a real-life person in a fictional context (or indeed a context that is masquerading as a 
factual context) that can appear to the viewer to be reality. Winick distinguished between 
manipulated images in which ‘no reasonable person would believe that factual information is 
being conveyed’ (1997, 191) and images that had realistic portrayals. It is suggested that a film 
producer would be striving for manipulations in which a reasonable person would consider that 
factual information is being conveyed. The film producer is relying on the implied trust and 
consent of the viewer of the film, who is prepared to suspend disbelief. 
  
Virtual Maggie, in its use of the deceased character of Margaret Thatcher, is in a different 
context to the manipulations of people still living, who can either consent or potentially take 
action potentially. Our case also differs from the resurrection of fictional characters played 
formerly by deceased actors, such as in Star Wars Rogue One (Gareth Edwards 2016) where 
Peter Cushing was recreated digitally for the role of Grand Moff Tarkin utilising footage 
from Star Wars A New Hope (George Lucas 1977), where the studio owns rights in the 
performance embodied in the previous film. It is more akin to the presentation of certain 
deceased pop stars ‘as live’ on stage by use of hologram (such as Prince, Tupac, Elvis Presley, 
Buddy Holly) where digitisation of their previously filmed performances is presented interactively 
with a live band. However, in that case the audience is not deceived that the portrayal is actually 
happening in the now. Where digital resurrection is referred to, it can be seen that it is in 
the Ekaratne Category C use of digitally created film performances of deceased people 
portrayed as themselves.  
  
Legal approach to death and reputation after death  
 
Death comes to everyone. With death, however, some legal rights come to an end, whilst others 
are created and still others are continued as if death had not intervened. On death, the 
deceased may no longer vote in an election, for example, but may still stand as a candidate in 
an election if already on the ballot. The Courts will uphold the wishes of the deceased made 
clear in valid testamentary dispositions. The Government may make laws relating to the 
deceased, such as the UK’s Organ Donation (Deemed Consent) Act 2019, which now requires 
an opt-out rather than an opt-in for organ donation. A whole set of laws around bodily integrity of 
the deceased arise on death: autopsies, burials, cremations as well as organ donation. The 
property of the deceased remains in their ownership and control through their agents 




(executors or administrators) until disposed of via their testamentary wishes. Certain types of 
artefacts created through intellectual property remain in existence until a period of time post-
mortem (in the UK, 70 years after death for certain types of Copyright), whilst neighbouring 
rights such as moral rights also remain personal to the deceased post-mortem. Consent is 
required from those authorised to act on behalf of the deceased to licence the use of these 
creative artefacts.  However, in the UK there are no rights of publicity in the image of a person 
similar to those that exist in many States of the USA. Some of these exist post-mortem, such as 
in Tennessee where the right exists in perpetuity. Rights to sue for defamation also do not 
survive death on the basis that reputation is personal only and the deceased cannot feel harm 
as a result of a defamatory statement (Hatchard 1887).   
 
Dissemination of manipulated images without the consent of the subject of the image can result 
in harm to the subject on an emotional level, and on a reputational level, which may result in 
financial loss. If the subject were alive, they would be able to sue for financial losses for 
reputational harm, such in Irvine (2003) for passing off as a result of manipulated image (the 
loss of a fee) or in defamation as in Charleston, although the Court found there was no 
defamation in that case. It seems otiose that reputational harm post-mortem is not capable of 
similar protection. Certainly, financially many deceased persons in the entertainment industry 
attain significant earnings post-mortem: Forbes magazine publishes a list of top earning dead 
celebrities annually. In 2019, Michael Jackson grossed $60 million while Elvis Presley grossed 
$39 million – significant amounts which can be affected by reputational damage (Forbes 2019).   
If manipulated images are considered sui generis, there is no reason why the law should not 
afford specific protections to the deceased.   
  
Defamation – time for a rethink?  
 
Film producers seeking to digitally resurrect the dead should tread carefully. Manipulated 
images which ‘blacken the reputation’ of the deceased may not currently be subject to 
defamation action in many jurisdictions including the UK, but technological development might 
and perhaps should prompt a rethink.   
 
The ruling in Hatchard clearly was a product of a different age. Dissemination of manipulated 
images is now much easier than of a statement of a defamatory nature in 1887. In Hatchard, the 
statement was an assertion that a trademark was being falsely used. It would have been difficult 




to see how this statement could have been widely disseminated beyond advertising in a 
newspaper. The concept of and protection of reputation was completely different in 1887; now, it 
is well-established that reputation per se is protected under the Human Rights Act 
1998.  Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has accepted that damage to the 
reputation of a deceased can have reputational impact on family members of the deceased, 
who can give grounds for a claim in defamation (Putistin 2013). Judge Lemmens summarised: 
  
This judgment is important in that it accepts that under certain conditions the damage to 
the reputation of a deceased person can affect the private life of that person’s surviving 
family members. The judgment makes very clear, however, that such a situation will 
occur only in relatively exceptional circumstances. (Putistin 2013, Paragraph 1) 
 
It is submitted that the damage to financial earnings may be greater and more protected. In the 
UK, the revision of the law was considered in the 1948 Defamation Committee, where it was 
proposed that the law should not be changed, whilst in the Faulks Committee report of 
1975, there was a recommendation that, for a period of five years after death, specified 
survivors should be entitled to bring an action limited to a declaration that the matter complained 
of was untrue and to an injunction, but not for damages. This was not enacted. The topic was 
raised again during the debates leading to the Defamation Act 2013 but not fully debated. The 
issue has also been raised in consultations before the Scottish Assembly (2011), the Northern 
Irish Assembly (2014) and also before the Republic of Ireland Dail (2003).  However, in certain 
jurisdictions post-mortem rights to protect reputation exist: in the Philippines, in the State of 
Tasmania in Australia, and in the states of Georgia, Nevada and Idaho, where specific 
protection provides for family members to sue for defamation in respect of the publication of 
false matters (including images) which tend to blacken the name of the deceased.  
  
With digital resurrection, some film producers create manipulated images which are intended to 
and have the potential to cause the viewer to have a misleading view that the deceased actually 
acted in the way depicted and made the statements depicted. By its very nature this ambiguity 
is designed to suspend the disbelief of the audience. Where this affects the reputation of 
someone recently deceased and so affects their family members directly, it is submitted that the 
courts should rethink whether they should not be able to sue for defamation. In the 
circumstances, ethically (if not yet legally) a film producer engaging in digital resurrection such 




as with Virtual Maggie should certainly seek the consent of those who might be directly 




This paper investigates the area of historical deepfake imagery from three perspectives: 
Creative Screen Practice, Technological Practice and Legal. While seemingly disparate areas of 
research, this work has highlighted challenges both within the respective fields, and between 
them. These tensions are examined within the concrete setting of the practice-based project 
Virtual Maggie. Creative screen practice has highlighted quality and filmmaking challenges 
which are both specific to the historical deepfakes in the Virtual Maggie project, but also are 
faced during the wider process of using deepfakes in film production. This leads to the technical 
challenges where conventional deepfake methods are unlikely to be suitable due to the limited 
amount of low-quality imagery available. Underpinning both areas is the legal aspect which 
examined the reputational and defamation implications of using a historical figure in a new 
context. The legal aspects discussed in this paper are likely to both constrain and guide 
filmmaking and technological approaches. 
 
Deepfake systems typically store a representation of the face to be replaced encoded in the 
parameters of a neural network which can then be used to reconstruct the face in a new pose. 
The proposed framework in this paper takes a different route, which requires an original image 
of the actor's face. Both these approaches need to consider the input data; conventional 
approaches need to consider usage rights and future legal consequences for a large amount of 
imagery required to train the decoder, whereas the proposed framework requires rights for just a 
single image. 
 
This leads to creative practice issues as to how well future technology will be able to represent 
and warp an input historical face into poses which diverge from the captured pose, and the 
constraints this will impose on filmmakers when planning shoots where actors’ faces will be 
replaced. As the technology behind deepfakes is progressing very quickly, establishing 
guidelines for filmmakers is also challenging due to the continuously changing requirements 
imposed by the technological state-of-the-art. 
 




It should be noted that this paper has focused exclusively on the deepfake image. Machine 
learning can also be used to create deepfake audio – in comparison a more straightforward 
process. However, in screen drama the filmmaker’s desire to direct an actor’s vocal 
performance would appear to exclude the use of artificially delivered lines of script. No matter 
how perfectly convincing a deepfake voice might be, many directors would prefer the creative 
opportunities of collaborating with a voice actor to deliver this key element of a synthetised 
screen performance. 
 
In summary, this work has found that the three areas examined in this work are deeply 
intertwined. Legal issues may impact the development and deployment of the technology 
behind deepfakes, whereas the technology has a significant impact on the constraints and 
opportunities for filmmakers, who in turn may create content which has consequences for the 
perceived legacy and reputation of historical figures. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our research during the Virtual Maggie project highlights considerable obstacles to the adoption 
of a deepfakes approach to digital face replacement in High Definition television drama and 
independent film. This article has highlighted creative and technological issues facing creative 
practitioners in working with machine learning and has explored the legal issues associated with 
the digital resurrection of the deceased. The ambition of our study was to investigate whether a 
deepfakes approach to digital face replacement is viable in high definition screen production. At 
this point, we can conclude that neither Virtual Maggie nor Channel 4’s Alternative Christmas 
Message has been able to demonstrate an equivalent believability in digital face replacement to 
the work of the DVFX postproduction houses for Disney and other major studios. However, the 
fact that Framestore, a company responsible for the DVFX on big-budget features such as 
Mulan (Niki Caro, 2020) and Gravity (Alfonso Cuaron, 2013), is already involved in deepfakes 
for television broadcast indicates that corporate leaders in this part of the screen industry are 
convinced of the future for machine learning. Although the task of generating deepfakes of 
historical figures comes with its own set of technological challenges, our experimental 
framework developed in the Virtual Maggie prototype offers a solution towards solving these 
limitations though a novel combination of deep learning techniques. 
The most important questions still to be addressed are the ethical issues that must be 
confronted before the point, in a few years’ time, when advanced machine learning allows digital 




face replacement to be widely accessible at a very high level of believability. In creating Virtual 
Maggie, we have become acutely aware of the responsibilities of creators when working with 
this technology. With deepfakes entering the mainstream of screen production, there is an 
opportunity for both legislators and industry stakeholders to address the complex ethical issues 
that arise from this significant change in screen culture. 
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